Abstract-RFID tag has limited calculation resources and small storage capacity, the wireless communication channel between RFID tag and reader is vulnerable to various malicious attacks. Aimed at these problems, a HMAC-based RFID lightweight authentication protocol is proposed in this paper, and some considerations about protocol implementation are made subsequently. In the new protocol, only the Hash function and XOR operation are used, so that the calculation capacity and storage space of RFID reader are utilized efficiently, the demand for the capacity of calculation and storage of tag are reduced. The protocol framework and the packet format are presented. The hardware implementation was done in Verilog HDL for an FPGA target device to get a fast prototype. The analysis of security and performance show that the new protocol can resist some malicious attacks, such as spoofing attack, replay attack, tracking, etc., and is suitable for low-cost RFID system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a new technology using wireless radio (50 kHz~5.8GHz) automatically identifying mobile objects under the open environment, which can collect and process information fast and accurately. RFID is one of the ten important technologies developed at the end of twenty century, which is a convenient and efficient mechanism used widely for identification or authentication in logistics, transportation, entrance control and retail, etc. In RFID system, communication between reader and tag usually occurs via wireless communication which is an insecure channel, thus the system easily suffers from spoofing attack, replay attack and eavesdropping, etc. It needs some security mechanisms to ensure its security. But the RFID tag has small storage space and the low capacity to calculate, which make designing a secure, efficient and low cost RFID security mechanism become a challenging research subject. While designing RFID protocol, we'd better reduce the calculation load of tag, in order to improve the efficiency of protocol.
A. Risks of the RFID System
Because of the wireless communication like noncontact and broadcast signal between reader and tag, attacker has much opportunity to launch attacks, thus RFID system is vulnerable to all kinds of attacks. The main risks of the RFID system are as follows:
1) Spoofing attack The attacker masquerades as a reader and sends a query, and then obtains the response of tag. When the legitimate reader queries tag, the attacker will send the obtained response to reader. So the attacker shields the response of genuine tag, and achieves the authentication. Generally speaking, the main ways to solve spoofing attack are performing authentication and data encryption.
2) Replay attack When reader sends a query to tag, the attacker obtains the response of tag by eavesdropping. In the next authentication, the attacker sends the obtained information to the reader and achieves the authentication. Generally speaking, the challenge-response mechanism can solve replay attack; timestamp and counter are often used to resist it.
3) Tracking The attacker tracks tag through the responded information from tag, which threats the privacy of tag.
4) Desynchronization
This attack makes the information of tag and backdatabase inconsistent by destroying the performing of protocol, and also makes tag disabled.
B. Related Work
At present, there are basically two approaches to solve the security and privacy problems of RFID systems. The one is physical method, such as Killing, Faraday and Active jamming; the other is cryptology method. The physical method is either inconvenient or costly. Today, most of RFID protocols are built by the cryptology method, which include the mechanism of static ID and dynamic ID .The characteristic of mechanism of static ID is that the identifier of tag keeps the same during the whole authentication, but that of mechanism of dynamic ID is that the identifier of tag is changed. Each mechanism has its advantages and weaknesses. The protocols which are based on the mechanism of static ID are listed as follows: Hash-Lock [1] , the randomized Hash-Lock [2] , the distributed RFID challenge-response authentication protocol [3] , etc. Here, we mainly introduce the mechanism of static ID which is closely related to our research work.
1 ID .There is a pseudo-random number generator built in the tag. The details of the protocol can be referenced in [4] . After the careful analysis, Gao et al.'s protocol cannot protect privacy of the users since the tag transmits a fixed message ) ( T  ID  h to the reader. If any attacker eavesdrop the message, he/she can track the tag.
2) The Chen et al.'s protocol In 2007, Chen et al. proposed an improvement mechanism [5] to fix the flaw of Gao et al.'s scheme. Although the improved protocol can prevent tracking, it still couldn't resist the other attacks, such as spoofing attack. The attacker masquerades as a legitimate reader to send a query through forward channel, and then obtains k from tag. When the legitimate reader sends a query, the attacker uses k to response the legitimate reader through back channel, in such case, the legitimate reader still considers communicating with the genuine tag, but actually the tag has left. In this protocol, as k,
are always changed during each authentication, it is difficult for an attacker to track tag with the eavesdropped message. At the same time, due to random number k is changed each time, so this protocol can resist the spoofing attack. After carefully analyzing the protocol in [6] , we can see that tag needs four times hash calculation, but it has very limited storage space and lower capacity to calculate, so excessive calculation will inevitably affect the efficiency of protocol.
C. Our Contribution
Due to property of the RFID application, such as wireless communication, radio signal and the limited resources, both efficient and secure authentication protocols of RFID become an important research subject. This paper analyzes several existed RFID protocols, and proposes a RFID protocol based on the method of HMAC aimed at the efficiency problem of [6] . The new protocol efficiently takes advantage of the capacity of calculation and storage space of RFID reader [7] , and reduces the calculation of RFID tag, which is of great significance for most of the low cost RFID application. Furthermore, the format of frame and packet are presented for the new protocol. The hardware implementation was done in Verilog HDL for a FPGA target device to get a fast prototype.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a new HMAC-based authentication Protocol. In Sect. 3, a formal analysis to the new protocol using BAN logic is presented. Section 4 security analysis and performance evaluation for the new protocol is given. In Sect. 5 the details of design and implementation based on FPGA are described. Conclusions and future works are discussed in Sect. 6.
II. A NEW HMAC-BASED PROTOCOL
Assume that H is a one-way hash function in cryptography; ID is a unique identifier of tag T, which is stored in the tag and the back-database DB; there is a pseudo-random number generator in the tag, which can perform Hash function and XOR operation; there is also a pseudo-random number generator with the ability to perform Hash function in the reader R. Moreover, the reader R can store and transmit the data between reader and back-database; back-database can perform Hash function. The communication channel between reader and back-database is secure. ) ( X H ID denotes the secret key
ID is used to produce hash value for the massage X. Here, we assume that Hash algorithm is a keyed-hash algorithm, that means,
is a HMAC with secret key ID . The protocol is shown in Figure 2 . According to the order of transmitted message, the authentication process goes as follows: Step1: Challenge RFID reader generates a random nonce R N , and then sends it and a query to all the tags. Three situations may occur at this time: 1) No tag responds. 2) One tag responds. 3) Many tags respond at the same time. When conflicts emerge among many tags, the collision arbitration will be performed, such as the binary search algorithm [8] , which chooses a tag to communicate with reader at last.
Step2: T-R Response
The chosen tag in step1 generates a random nonce T N , (ISO and EPC GEN2 standard support to generate random number in the tag), and then computes 
, it will filter this tag. If this tag is legitimate in the previous authentication, this filtering can reduce the calculation load of the backdatabase; when this tag is illegitimate, this filtering can avoid the replay attack to the back-database.
The back-database searches whether there exists certain
,m is the largest number of tags)to
. If there exists, tag will pass the authentication and be considered as legitimate, and then back-database will send
and ID to reader; otherwise the tag is illegitimate, the failure information will be sent to reader, the protocol is aborted. Step5: R -T Reply When reader receives the μ and ID from backdatabase, it will store the ID in the memory and send μ to tag. Tag verifies whether the received
, which is the calculation result of R N , T N and the stored ID of tag. If they are equal, reader achieves authentication and tag stays quiet; otherwise the authentication of reader fails.
III. FORMAL ANALYSIS
The aim of RFID authentication protocol is to achieve authentication of tag and reader each other. The new protocol in this paper belongs to no trust-third-party participation authentication protocol. This section will discuss the formal analysis of it. We adopt the BAN logic [9] to achieve it, which is a classic analysis way of secure protocols.
First of all, we formalize the messages of protocol in order to satisfy the need of formal analysis. The new protocol achieves mutual identity authentication of reader and tag, which could be curtailed to three communication messages. They are shown as follows:
(1) R 一>T:
According to the analysis process of the BAN logic, firstly we should idealize the protocol, and then do initialization and assumption, finally write down the goal of protocol, the analysis is as follows: 1) Idealization of the protocol M1:
By A1 and ①, getting
By M2, getting ○ 3 : sees (R, T N ), sees (R, R N ); By A1 and ③, getting ○ 4 : sees (R, ( T N , R N )); By ② and ④, getting
By A2 and ○ 7 , getting
By M1, getting ○ 9 : sees (T, R N ); By M3, getting ○ 10 : sees (T, T N ); By ○ 9 and ○ 10 , getting ○ 11 : sees (T, ( R N , T N )); By ○ 8 and ○ 11 , getting ○ 12 : bel (T, said (R, ( R N , T N ))). The goal G2 is achieved. The above analysis proves the new protocol can achieve the mutual authentication between reader R and tag T.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Spoofing attack, replay attack, tracking and desynchronization are common security threats that RFID protocol faces. As far as the above security threats are concerned, in this section we mainly analyze the security of the new protocol and evaluate its performance.
A.. Spoofing attack
The attacker masquerades as a legitimate reader to send a query and R N to tag through forward channel R->T; and then obtains the response of tag: However, reader generates a new random number during each authentication, that is R N ≠ R N ' , so the attacker can not masquerade as a reader to do spoofing attack. Therefore, the proposed protocol for spoofing attack is secure.
B. Replay attack
After reader sends a query and R N to tag, the attacker obtains tag's response 
C. Tracking
That is, the attacker intercepts the response of tag:
and T N , and analyzes the response carefully, then tracks tag.
As tag generates a new random number during each authentication, and the Hash operation is one-way, the attacker can not determine which tag does the response from the message ) , , 0 (
. So our protocol is secure for tracking.
D. Desynchronization
As the ID of tag is fixed, even if loss of message, power failure or loss of connection with back-database happens during the authentication, it would not affect back-database and become an obstacle to the protocol.
The new protocol and the above security analysis go well based on the assumption that the key ID is strictly confidential. The security of the protocol relies on the secrecy of ID. If the tag is compromised, this secret is revealed and hence an attacker may masquerade as the tag to the database. However, this should not be considered an attack as it can happen with any protocol where the ID of the tag is revealed. The new protocol belongs to the mechanism of static ID of RFID authentication protocol. In recent years, there are similar schemes such as: Sarmar [1], Weis [2] and Y.C. Lee [6] and so on, the security of the new protocol compared with related schemes is shown in Table I . The performance of RFID protocol is mainly measured by the storage (tag) space, calculation (tag and backdatabase), communications (between the tag and reader), etc. Suppose that, l is the length of ID or Hash; h is Hash operation; r is the operation of generating random number; (the length of random number is much smaller than ID , so it can be neglected); n is the number of tag. The performance of the new protocol compared with related schemes is shown Table II. Compared with the mechanism of static ID , the tag of the new protocol needs to store its identifier ID merely. During each authentication, the tag produces a random number and does two Hash operations. Compared with [6] , the new protocol significantly reduces the calculation load of tag. In particular, with the increase of the number of tag, the storage space and search time of back-database increase, but the calculation of tag does not increase, so the new protocol is suitable for large-scale RFID systems, whose security is very well. 
V. PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
In the section, some considerations about the implementation of the new protocol will be made. We give some considerations concerning the architecture of RFID tag. Based experiment result, some test instances for authentication and attack have been shown.
The simulation of protocol is done in the environment of Actel Libero IDE version 8.5, which is a complete set of software tool kit for Actel fitted to its all the FPGA designs [10, 14] . The Libero IDE can rapidly and efficiently manage the whole design process, from design, synthesis and simulation to basic planning, layout wiring, timing constraints, power analysis and program files generating. We adopt hardware programming language named Verilog HDL to compile tag of RFID security protocols and to simulate signal flow of wireless transmission channel [11] . The test file testbench motivates tag to check the change of each signal, the value of input and output. The simulation uses CRCl6 cyclic redundancy check [12] to realize the hash function, due to the low computational power and storage space of tag. We hope the achievement of simulation to be beneficial for RFID chip.
The process of tag verifying reader is simulated in the experiment, which is the similar to the process of tag verifying reader. Tag identifier ID and pseudo random number [13] R N needed by the reader, are got from EEPROM directly, which is different from querying database.
A. The format and rule of protocol
The message rules of wireless channel are set according to the proposed protocol and the demand of simulation. The protocol is decomposed of three steps, which can be transmitted from message 1 to message 3, are shown in Figure 3 . Table III .
In order to simplify, the length of frame is set as 8 byte, in practice, which is not sufficient to relay the message contained within the tag. It can be improved to change the length of frame or longer frame structure. In this simulation, the length of pseudo random number R N and T N are set as 8 bit, tag identifier ID as 16 bit. The frame head and frame trail are defined as hexadecimal data 0xaa, namely 10101010 binary. Message 1 is a query from reader, including command word and R N . The command word is set as 0x01 in the second byte, and the third byte is the value of R N . Message 2 is a response as reader to tag, including
and the pseudo random number T N , and the command word of response which is set as 0x02. σ is 16 bit encrypted ciphertext, and high 8 bit is put in the fifth byte, low 8 bit for the sixth byte, for
N is put in the fourth byte.
Message 3 is the second message that reader sends, including μ and the command word. The second byte is command word which is set as 0x03. μ is 16 bit encrypted ciphertext, high 8 bit is put in the fifth byte, low 8 bit for the sixth byte,
B. The design of module
The internal logic control functions of tag can be completed to use the state machine or a microprocessor. Using the state machine model needs low cost, and adopting the microprocessor can be more flexible. This design adopts the state machine, which is suitable for low cost of smart tags. The simulation system consists of four parts, includes the state machine, the receiving module, the sending module and EEPROM. Figure 4 shows the connection between these modules and the flow of signal.
1) The state machine Chip system has many different verification requirements and response during various stages of the protocol. If every stage is considered as a state, the state machine is most convenient to switch over module, so we can use the state machine as the central control module. According to the process of message exchange in protocol, the state machine, namely Moore, is utilized, that means the state machine's output is only decided by the state, which is independent of the input of the state.
There are seven states in the state machine, as shown in Figure 5 , the state flag ff is effective when it is one; the enable signal able_en is effective when it is one, indicates the state machine enters the work state; system reset signal rst is effective when it is one, by which state machine enters the idel state. Seven states and the transfer of control signals are described as follows. idle: it is a silent state, when system reset signal rst=1, the state machine enters the idle state, in which only when the enable signal able_en =1, the state machine transfers to the S_1 state.
S_1: it is initial state. The sending module sends message 1, according to the R N provided by EEPROM and the command format of Query, then sets ff=1. The state machine transfers to the S_2 state.
S_2: tag is ready to receive message 1. If it receives an intact frame, the format of frame is parsed firstly. If the frame is consistent with the command format of message 1, the state flag ff is set to one, and S_3 state will be entered. If the format is wrong, idle state will be entered.
S_3 S_6: after the message 3 has been verified, tag successfully authenticates reader, and control_a is set one, the state machine transfers to idel state.
2) The sending module and the receiving module UART is a crucial module between all kinds of devices for communication. When a device communicates with another, usually the digital signal is used. It contains the sending module, which is responsible for sending the message of the current state, and the receiving module which is responsible for receiving and parsing the message. At transmitter, a parallel digital signal must be converted into a serial signal, and then transmitted to another device through wire or wireless channel. At receiver, the serial signal must be transmitted to the parallel signal to process. UART is used to process the data bus and transformation between serial-parallel and parallel-serial. UART is widely used, such as mobile phones, industrial control, PC etc.
In this simulation, we set the length of frame of each message is 64 bit, but the transmitter can send only 8 bit for each time, so the transmitter must do an operation for serial-parallel, and the message can be sent for eight groups; the receiver must transform eight group serial signal to 64 bit parallel signal, then process them.
3) EEPROM EEPROM stores R N and the tag identifier ID.
C. Simulation
In sequence diagram, the signal data represents random nonce T N with the length of 8 bit. In a moment, able_en=1, the random nonce is current effective random number; the tag identifier ID, namely the key, is stored in EEPROM, with the length of 16 bit, and also is set for 0x1010. The signal u_din represents the input of each message, with the length of 64 bit; the signal data_out represents the output of each message, with the length of 64 bit; the signal data_change represents a test signal of malicious attacks, with the length of 64 bit; the signal control_e=1, means the process of communication has error; the signal control_a=1, means tag successfully verifies reader, and this communication is finished. The system testing diagram is shown subsequently. Figure 6 . the system testing diagram 1) A right verification process A right verification process of simulation is shown as Figure 7, 8, 9 , and 10. We mainly view the state signal state, the input of data u_din and the output of data data_out. Figure 7 shows, at the sate of idle, the value of state is 000; this moment the sate machine makes no response. Figure 8 shows, in S_1, message 1 is sent; at the current state S_2, the received message is aa01ff00000000aa. After verifying the frame head and frame trail of message, it is consistent with the format of message 1, then state machine transfers to S_3 and the state is from 010 to 011. Figure 9 shows, at the state of S_3, the state signal state is 011, the sent message 2 is aa02006f000000aa, and then the state is from 011 to 100. Figure 10 shows, at the state of S_5, the state signal is 101. In state S_4, message 3 is sent, at the state S_5, it is received with data of aa03ff6f939800aa. According to 2) An attacking verification process An attacking verification process of simulation is shown as Figure 11 , and it shows the scene that the spoofing attack happens. The process of verification 1 in this simulation is the same as the above verification process, as shown in Figure 7 . Figure 11 shows, at the state of S_2, the frame head and frame trail of the received message 1 is not in accordance with the predefined format, then the value of state is from the current state 010 to idle, and the value of control_e will become one. This process simulates the action of impersonated reader launching a query to tag. On the other hand, the R N and T N is changeable all the time, so the replay attack and tracking can't happen.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a low-cost RFID mutual authentication protocol based on the method of HMAC. Under the assumption that the Hash function is secure, the property that the new protocol can achieve mutual authentication between reader and tag has been proved by the BAN logic. The careful security analysis shows that the new protocol can resist spoofing attack, replay attack and other common attacks against RFID authentication protocol. Moreover, the efficiency evaluation shows that the new protocol is low-cost, which is fit for the demand of limited calculation capacity and storage of tag. These properties make the new protocol meet the application of some low-cost RFID systems.
